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We study the monetary compensation for non-fatal accident risk in Switzerland using the
number of accidents within cells dened over industryskill-level of the job and capitalizing
on the partial panel structure of our data which allows us to empirically isolate the wage
component specic to the employer. Our results show that using accident risk at a lower
level of aggregation, using narrower samples of workers, and using the wage component
that is specic to the rm all yield higher estimates of risk compensation. Our preferred
estimate gives an estimate of about 36,000 Swiss francs per prevented injury per year.
JEL classication: J17, J28, J31
Keywords: Compensating wage dierentials, value of a statistical injury, risk measurement
We thank to Olivier Steiger, Rainer Winkelmann and Josef Zweim uller for helpful comments and sugges-
tions and Alois F assler from the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund (Suva) for providing us with the data and
helpful guidelines concerning the handling of the data. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation under grant no. 100012-103970 (Oliver Ruf), the research grant of the University of Zurich under grant
no. 53211602 (Andreas Kuhn), and the Austrian Science Fund (National Research Network: \The Austrian
Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State") is gratefully acknowledged. Contact:
Andreas Kuhn, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, M uhlebachstrasse 86,
8008 Zurich, Switzerland, kuhn@iew.uzh.ch; Oliver Ruf, Suva, Fluhmattstrasse 1, 6002 Lucerne, Switzerland,
oliver.ruf@suva.ch.
11 Introduction
Empirical studies document a remarkable increase in the value of life in the past few decades
(Costa and Kahn, 2004) and a more general increase in the value of nonmarket goods like health
and longevity (Costa and Kahn, 2003; Murphy and Topel, 2006). One important part of this
more general trend in the price of health is workers' willingness to pay for the prevention of
workplace-related accidents, both fatal and non-fatal. It is also the compensation for workplace
safety which has attracted most interest in the empirical literature, and there is a large number
of empirical studies which try to pin down the compensation for accident risks, as well as for
a wide range of other job amenities and disamenities (the surveys by Viscusi and Aldy (2003)
and Viscusi (1993) are of special interest here; see also the more recent survey by Ashenfelter
(2006)).1 Most empirical studies nd a positive compensation for fatal accident risk, often
yielding high implicit values of a statistical life. For example, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report
that half of the studies from the U.S. labor market surveyed in their article give a value of a
statistical life within the range of $3.8 to $9.0 million (in prices of 2000), the median estimate
being about $7 million. Most studies from outside the U.S. labor market give estimates within
the same range. It is dicult to assess the exact reasons for this wide range of estimates,
since the studies dier in various ways, for example with respect to the available data and
risk measure2, or in the econometric methods applied. The evidence on the compensation for
non-fatal accident risk is much less coherent, which is somewhat surprising since most studies
that present estimates of such compensation are based on the same data as estimates for the
compensation for fatal accident risk. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) report, for both the U.S. as
well as other labor markets, a probable range for the value of a statistical injury of about
$20,000 to about $70,000 per injury.3 Very similar estimates of the value of injury are reported
in Leeth and Ruser (2003). Moreover, they also point out considerable dierences between
dierent demographic groups. Relatedly, a recent study by Wei (2007) reports substantial
wage compensation for job-related illness periods, ranging from 27% up to 140% of annual
earnings per prevented illness episode per year.
The key problem from the empirical point of view is the potential sorting of workers into jobs
diering in their risk of accidents. Hwang et al. (1992), among others, argue that the problem
of main concern are dierences in unobservables which in turn relate to the productivity of
workers and thus may lead to sorting of workers into jobs with dierent risks. The sorting
of workers in turn is endogenous due to the fact that the income elasticity of the value of a
1Compensating wage dierentials have also been found, for example, for the risk of unemployment (Lalive
et al., 2006; Moretti, 2000), for shift work (Kostiuk, 1990), and uncertainty with respect to future earnings
(Feinberg, 1981). Stern (2004) studies the compensating wage dierential for being a scientist.
2Most importantly perhaps, some studies rely not on direct measures of risk (i.e. number of accidents), but
base their analyses on tradeos outside the labor market, e.g. on the tradeo between trac accidents and the
price of automobiles (Dreyfus and Viscusi, 1995) or fatalities related to bicycle accidents and the prize of bicycle
helmets (Jenkins et al., 2001). Other studies have used subjective assessments of risk, as for example Viscusi
and O'Connor (1984) and Viscusi and Hersch (2001).
3See table 5(a) and table 5(b) in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for an overview of the relevant literature and the
corresponding estimates of the value of a statistical injury.
2statistical life or injury is positive, i.e. more productive workers sort themselves into less risky
jobs by accepting ceteris paribus lower wages. Viscusi and Aldy (2003), for example, report an
income elasticity of about 0.5-0.6. On the other hand though, Shogren and Stamland (2002)
argue that the bias in estimating the compensating wage dierential could run in the other
direction, assuming that workers not only dier in their productivity, but also with respect
to their skill in avoiding accidents. Thus, workers in risky jobs could be either more tolerant
to risk or more skilled in avoiding risk (or both). Thus they show that the estimated risk
compensation might actually be upward biased, rather than downward biased. Some studies
have tried to approach the problem of endogenous sorting by using instrumental variables
(DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Garen, 1988, for example,).4 One potentially promising way of
dealing with the problem of sorting is to rely on panel or, ideally, matched employer-employee
data (Dale-Olsen, 2006; Woodcock, 2008). The second important empirical issue concerns the
measurement of the risk of an accident. First, as pointed out by Mellow and Sider (1983)
for example, typical survey data are more often than not plagued by measurement error, i.e.
it seems to be the case that workers often misreport their industry aliation and/or their
exact occupation. Assuming that this kind of measurement error is random, this causes the
compensating dierential to be biased towards zero (Black and Kniesner, 2003). Second, there
clearly is a trade-o of the following form. On the one hand, risk measurements at a low level of
aggregation are preferred, as otherwise one might mix workers with very dierent occupations
into the same risk categories, giving rise to aggregation bias (Lalive, 2003). On the other hand
though, risk measures at a low aggregation level run into the problem that many cells will have
zero risk, at least for shorter periods of time. This is specically true for fatal accident risk,
yet obviously also applies to non-fatal injuries.
Our study presents empirical evidence on the compensation for non-fatal accident risk in
Switzerland. Our study has three main features. First, we will exclusively focus on non-fatal
accidents. This focus reects the fact that most accidents have non-fatal consequences and
thus, from the viewpoint of public health and safety, merit the most attention. We though
acknowledge that our focus is also due to data availability well as the empirical approach
we take, as we will discuss in more detail below. In the year 2004 (which is the year of our
empirical analysis), for example, the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund reports about 246,000 non-
fatal accidents related to work, but only 188 fatal accidents. The relative risk of experiencing
a non-fatal accident versus a fatal accident in a given year is thus about 1300 times higher.
Second, we observe the number of non-fatal accidents not only within entire industries, but also
within cells dened by industryskill-level of the job. This is a tremendous advantage from
an empirical point of view, since risks at (too) high levels of aggregation mix the risks of very
dierent groups of workers and dierent willingness to pay for avoiding risk, which might lead
to biased estimation of the compensation for risk in the workplace. Third, we capitalize on the
4The study by Garen (1988), for example, tries to correct for the endogeneity of job risk by using a system
of simultaneous equations where marital status and the number of dependents are used as instruments for the
preference over risk. However, one might argue that both marital status and family size are not very good
instruments because they are potentially correlated with risk preferences.
3availability of longitudinal wage information, which allows us to use simple panel estimation
methods in order to isolate the rm wage component. We believe that our empirical approach,
on the one hand using the number of non-fatal accidents within narrower cells than usually
available, and on the other hand combining panel data estimation methods with simple non-
parametric stratication, transcends the typical hedonic wage function approach often used in
the literature on the subject. Besides, we also complement previous evidence for Switzerland.
To the best of our knowledge, there is only a single published study on the compensation of
accident risk for Switzerland by Baranzini and Ferro-Luzzi (2001), though focusing on fatal
accident risk only. The main ndings of our empirical analysis are the following. First, we
nd that a simple hedonic wage regression yields a compensation for non-fatal accident risk
which is statistically zero, a result that is in line with some previous empirical studies. The
leading explanation for this result (which runs counter to theory) is presumably the sorting of
workers which dier in their unobserved productivity. Second, moving on to, in a sense, more
sophisticated (but, we believe, in this case also more reliable) methods, we nd a positive point
estimate for the compensation of non-fatal accident risk. Our preferred point estimate yields
an implicit value of a statistical injury of about 36,000 Swiss francs (which lies well within the
range given by studies from the U.S. labor market, as well as from studies outside the U.S.).
On the other hand, using dierent estimation methods yields considerably dierent values for
the value of a statistical injury.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the two data
sources we rely on and the construction of the key variables { along with some descriptive
statistics. The empirical analysis is presented and discussed in section 3. Specically, we will
discuss three dierent approaches to identication and estimation. We start with a simple
hedonic wage regression model, where the wage is simply regressed on individual- and rm-
specic characteristics. The second approach is based on the idea that we can control for
individual unobserved heterogeneity by an appropriate stratication of the sample. The third
approach capitalizes on the longitudinal structure of the wage data. We isolate the wage
component, which is specic to the rm and then use only this part of the wage to estimate
risk compensation. Based on our econometric results, we further present estimates of the value
of a statistical injury in Switzerland. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
Our primary data source is the Swiss Wage Structure Survey (SWSS; \Lohnstrukturerhebung
(LSE)"), a biannual survey among rms which is administered and made available by the
Swiss Federal Statistical Oce. The SWSS is one of the largest ocial surveys in Switzerland
focused mainly on employment-relevant information.5 The SWSS is a survey of rms, covering
5The second important labor market survey is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS; \Schweizerische Arbeit-
skr afteerhebung (SAKE)"). There are two main advantages of using the SWSS over the SLFS: First, the SWSS
allows isolating the wage rm xed eect, which is the part of the observed wage where risk compensation
should show up. Second, the SWSS is (as opposed to the SLFS) mailed to employers, and misclassication of
4the population of large rms along with a random sample of small rms. We use three dierent
waves of the SWSS (from the years 2000, 2002, and 2004) and we extract individual monthly
earnings along with several individual-specic characteristics (see section 2.1 below on details).
The SWSS includes average gross monthly wages for full-time employment (i.e. 172 hours per
month), including mandatory social security contributions and extra pay (e.g. for night work,
13. monthly wage). The SWSS also includes several socio-demographic characteristics (e.g.
age, gender, tenure, educational attainment (highest degree), citizenship) and dierent rm
characteristics (most importantly, the size of the rm along with it's geographic location).
Our risk measure corresponds to the number of non-fatal accidents within cells dened
over industry (forty dierent industries on a two-digit level) and skill-level of the job (four
dierent levels). The data have been provided by the Swiss Accident Insurance Fund (SAIF;
\Schweizerische Unfallversicherungsanstalt (Suva)"), which is the most important accident
insurance fund in Switzerland. The number of non-fatal accidents within industryskill-level
cells are available for the year 2004. One of the main features of our analysis is that our risk
measure rk gives the number of non-fatal accidents per year and per 1,000 workers within a
given industryskill-level cell k (instead of within-industry only). Data on the absolute number
of non-fatal accidents for the year 2004 is available within cells dened over industryskill-level
of job. Now, because the SAIF does not directly have the number of workers within these cells
and because workers are not uniformly distributed over these cells, we also need to know the
distribution of workers over these cells in order to compute the risk of a non-fatal accident.
To this end, we simply use the distribution of workers in the SWSS (from the year 2004),
and then approximate the population distribution of workers by multiplying the number of
workers within a given cell with the total number of workers which are covered by the SAIF
(about 1.827 millions in the year 2004).6 One main advantage of our data is that measurement
error in the risk data and industry-aliation of workers is arguably of minor signicance (as
already mentioned, Mellow and Sider (1983) have pointed out the problem of misclassication
of both industry and occupation). This is important because measurement error in the risk
variable tends to bias the compensating wage dierential towards zero (measurement error in
the dependent variable (i.e. wage) is, of course, also common but of less concern). We are
condent that measurement error for both our risk measure and industry-aliation is of no
great importance, since the SWSS does not involve employees but obtains the data from the
employer directly (such that misclassication of either industry and/or occupation is unlikely
to occur). For the same reason, we also believe that our wage information is more reliable
occupations and industries should therefore be of minimal order only (the same is arguably true for wages).
6Note that there is a fundamental trade-o with respect to the risk measure chosen: On the one hand, risk
measures on a highly disaggregated level are preferred, such that we do not pool accident risks of individuals
working in very dierent occupations and jobs. This has been pointed at, for example, by Viscusi (1993, p.1928),
noting that "[t]he main deciency of industry-based data is that they pertain to industry-wide averages and
do not distinguish among the dierent jobs within that industry [...]". On the other hand, accidents observed
at a very low level of aggregation also give rise to estimation problems, because the number of accidents tends
towards zero for most cells if we shrink the size of the risk-relevant cells. That, in fact, is the reason why we
decided not to use the information about fatal accidents for this study. Disaggregating the number of fatal
accidents over the skill-level of job actually yields far too many cells with zero number of accidents.
5than the information available in typical survey data (although presumably less reliable than
administrative data). Additionally, our risk measure is directly obtained from administrative
sources and should thus cover all relevant accidents.
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for both the overall sample as well as the sample of individ-
uals in jobs of the lowest skill-level (that will be used in the empirical analysis discussed below).
In both samples, we only consider workers aged between 16 and 64 (for men) and between 16
and 61 (for women). A second restriction applies to the size of the employer. Because we are
estimating wage xed eects for each rm, we also restrict the sample to workers from rms
which have at least ten workers in each of the four job skill-levels in each year. The overall
sample includes more than one million individual workers, the subsample of workers in the
lowest skill-level (with respect to the job, not with respect to the educational attainment of
the worker) consists of about 300,000 individual workers. In both cases, there are about 3,500
dierent rms (due to the restriction on rms). As we will discuss in-depth in section 3 below,
our preferred estimation approach will focus exclusively on workers within a given skill-level
as collected in the SWSS, as we believe that such a stratication of the workers yields more
reliable estimates of the compensating wage dierential.
Table 1
We begin with describing the overall sample, which is representative of the Swiss labor
market as a whole. The typical worker in the Swiss labor market has gross earnings equal to
6,300 Swiss francs a month, is about 40 years old and has about 9.5 years of tenure and is more
likely to be a man. The average employer has more than 2,800 workers (reecting the sampling
structure of the SWSS as well as the restriction with respect to the selection of the employers).
About two thirds of the workers are married, the other third single. The distribution of workers
with respect to educational attainment highlights two important characteristics of the Swiss
labor market in terms of education. First, compared to other countries, the number of workers
with tertiary education is rather low (e.g. only about 5.5% of the workers have a university
degree). Second, about half of the workers hold a vocational training. Another important
characteristic of the Swiss labor market is the large fraction (about 20%) of workers without
Swiss citizenship.
Focusing on individuals working in jobs with the lowest skill-level yields the expected result
that some groups are overrepresented in the analysis sample relative to the overall sample of
individuals (although this subset of individuals is similar to the overall sample with respect to
some characteristics, for example age and size or the geographic location of the employer).7
Here, average monthly earnings are only about 70% of the overall average earnings (about 4,500
Swiss francs per month). Moreover, a worker from skill-level four is more likely to be a woman,
7The distribution of workers over the skill-level of jobs looks as follows: About 6% work in the highest level,
about 20% in the second-highest level. 46% work in skill-level 3, and the remaining 28% of the workers are in
jobs of lowest skill-level.
6more likely to be married and much more likely not to have Swiss citizenship, compared with
a worker from the overall sample. The most striking dierence between the overall sample and
the lowest skill-level sample though is the distribution of workers with respect to educational
attainment. As table 1 shows, there are practically no workers with an educational degree above
vocational training. This, in fact, is a desired result with respect to the empirical approach we
take (see section 3 below): Given that education (of course not exclusively) reects dierences
in productivity, focusing on workers with similar educational attainment also implies that
these workers are more similar with respect to unobserved productivity-relevant characteristics
(compared to workers from all job skill-levels). We believe that the variance of unobserved
productivity is presumably lowest within the group of workers in the lowest skill-level (although
this presumption obviously is fundamentally empirically untestable).
Figure 1
As table 1 also shows, the typical worker in the year 2004 was faced with the risk of a
non-fatal, work-related accident of about 8.8% (i.e. there were 88 accidents on average per
1,000 workers). In the sample of workers with lowest skill-level, the average risk was about
half (about 43 accidents per 1,000 workers). Figure 1 shows a simple scatterplot between the
average logarithmic monthly wage and the number of non-fatal accidents for workers from the
lowest skill-level jobs at the level of industryskill-level. The scatterplot shows no relation
whatsoever between the two variables (if anything, the association goes the \wrong" way),
which is underlined by the estimated slope coecient from a regression of the average log
earnings on the number of accidents { yielding essentially a zero point estimate, both in
economic and statistical terms (the corresponding t-value is approximately zero). This result
is not especially surprising though since average wages within industries clearly may not only
reect dierences with respect to accident risks, but also dierences in the composition of
workers and jobs. We thus now move on to issues of identication and econometric estimation.
3 Empirical Analysis
We now discuss issues of identication and estimation of the compensating wage dierential
for (non-fatal) accident risk using dierent alternative empirical approaches along with the
corresponding results. We start with a simple hedonic wage regression of the following form:
yijk =  + x0
i + z0
j + rk + uijk; (1)
where yijk is the natural logarithm of the gross monthly wage of individual i, working in rm
j and industryskill-level cell k. x is a column vector of individual characteristics including
citizenship, educational attainment, age (and its square), tenure (and its square), a gender-
dummy and marital status. z is a column vector of characteristics describing the rm (and
thus reecting the characteristics of the job), and includes the size of the rm (and its square)
and the geographical location of the rm. r is our risk measure, corresponding to the number
7of non-fatal accidents in industryskill-level cell k per 1,000 workers in the year 2004. uijk
is the unobserved error term. The parameter of main interest is , which, under appropriate
assumptions, corresponds to the compensating wage dierential for non-fatal accident risk. As
mentioned before, the number of non-fatal accidents is only available for a single point in time,
so that we can essentially only run a cross-sectional hedonic wage regression.8 However, we
do have a partial panel structure with respect to wages, which we will try to capitalize on
later. However, as has been pointed out by several authors (e.g. Hwang et al., 1992), there is
good reason to act on the assumption that there is unobserved individual heterogeneity related
to wages (that is, these dierences somehow reect dierences in productivity not taken into
account for by observed variables) and that \safety" is a normal good (i.e. the demand for
\safety" increases as income rises). Thus, workers of high productivity sort themselves into
less risky jobs by accepting lower wages ceteris paribus. To stick with the model from equation
(1), the hedonic wage regression with unobserved individual heterogeneity made explicit can
be written as:
yijk =  + x0
i + z0
j + rk + i + ijk (2)
where (i + ijk) corresponds to the error term uijk in equation (1) whereby now we make the
problem of individual heterogeneity explicit (for simplicity,  is rescaled such that the partial
eect of  on y is equal to 1).9 Now, even if we can assume that ijk is mean independent
of the regressors, identication of the compensating wage dierential  is only achieved if the
unobserved eect  is also mean independent. Whenever there is reason to believe otherwise,
parameter  is not identied (and neither are the other parameters identied, but that is of
minor importance for our purposes, since we are not per se interested in these parameters).
As discussed in the introduction, the leading reason for a correlation between  and the
accident risk r is that  reects unobserved productivity, which is obviously related to the
wage y. If the demand for safety actually increases with income and if we are, at the same
time, unable to adequately control for productivity dierences, then this could quite plausibly
lead to a correlation between  and r. That is, more productive workers (i.e. workers with
above-average ) sort themselves into less-risky jobs by accepting lower wages, which in turn
leads to a correlation between the productivity measure  and the risk measure r, meaning
that identication of the risk compensation parameter  must ultimately fail.
Also note that the key regressor, the accident risk r, is measured at a higher level of
aggregation than the dependent variable and this needs to be taken into account when doing
statistical inference (Moulton, 1986). We therefore use robust standard errors, clustered at the
8Many, if not most, other empirical studies face the same problem of not observing the relevant risk measure
over time, as pointed out by Hwang et al. (1992, p.836): \While studies of this sort [i.e. panel studies] repre-
sent improvements over standard cross-sectional studies, their applicability is restricted by the availability of
longitudinal data sets that include the relevant nonwage job attribute variables. In most cases, this is a binding
constraint."
9Note that the error term ijk potentially also includes unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the rm
(Woodcock, 2008). We will take up this issue below.
8same level as the risk measure, i.e. either on the industry level or on the level of industryskill-
level of the job.
3.1 Sample Stratication
A rst and straightforward way of dealing with the problem of sorting is to stratify the sample
in such a way as to minimize the variation in the unobserved error component . That is, we
run the very same hedonic wage regression as given by equation (1), but only on a narrow(er)
subset of individuals. Ideally, this subset consists of individuals presumably as similar as
possible with respect to . That is, stratication is the simple non-parametric variant of the
hedonic wage regression before. However, since most often it is very dicult to control for ,
we think that stratifying the sample is probably a more fruitful approach. Our stratication
variable of primary interest is the skill-level of the job, which is recorded in the SWSS. Let
sij 2 f1;2;3;4g be the skill-level of individual i working in job j, where s = 1 (s = 4)
corresponds to the highest (lowest) skill-level of a given job. We thus run the same hedonic
wage regression as in equation (1), but only on a subset of individuals within a given skill-level
s. Specically, we will run the following regressions:
yijk =  + x0
i + z0
j + rk + uijk sij  s 2 f1;2;3;4g (3)
Note that this approach to estimation is basically the same as the control function approach,
the main dierence being that stratication allows all parameter estimates to vary between
dierent subsets of the sample10. However, we think it plausible that the main advantage of
the stratication is that we can minimize variation in  in this way, which ideally renders a
consistent estimate of the compensating wage dierential .11
Table 2
Table 2 shows the estimated parameters of the compensation for non-fatal accidents. The
rst column in each panel of table 2 shows estimates when using accident risk at the level
of industryskill-level of the job, while the second column uses accident risk at the industry
level only. Estimated parameters of the hedonic wage function, as given by equation (1), are
given in column (1) and (2) of table 2. The point estimate of the non-fatal accident risk is
negative in both cases (-0.00005 and -0.00015, respectively), although statistically not dierent
from zero (t-value of about 0.8 and 1.3, respectively). This result is in fact in line with either
10That is, the control function approach yields the same estimates as sample stratication if all parameters
would be interacted with the variable on which stratication is based on. However, such a fully interacted
regression model is, due to the large number of parameters to be estimated, often dicult to interpret.
11As we will show later, our stratication approach actually reduces the dierences between groups of workers
with respect to the observed wage (on this point, see table 4). For example, in the overall sample the dierence in
mean monthly earnings between men and women amounts to about 1,700 Swiss francs (about one third relative
to the female average). In the subsample of workers within the lowest skill-level, the dierence in average
earnings amounts to only about 630 Swiss francs (relative to the female average, a bit less than 15%). Although
this is only suggestive evidence, we still believe that this exactly what one would expect if the presumption
holds that the variance in  is lower in the lower skill-levels of jobs.
9endogenous sorting of workers. As already discussed, the leading explanation for the \wrong"
sign of the risk variable is endogenous sorting of workers into jobs with dierent risks. As we
do not put much condence in this simple hedonic wage regression, so we quickly move on to
the next results.
The remaining columns in table 2 also show parameter estimates from a simple hedonic
wage regression, but only for a subset of workers each. As we narrow the range of the skill-
level, the point estimate of risk compensation moves towards the expected direction. Focusing
on workers in the lowest skill-level only yields a positive point estimate on the risk measure
(^  = 0.00024), which moreover is almost statistically signicant on the 10% level (t-value of
1.63). Using the risk measure at the industry level also yields a positive, but much smaller and
statistically not signicant point estimate in this group of workers. Indeed, the point estimate
using the ner risk measure is almost ve times as large as the point estimate based on the
industry-level accident risk.
Also note that the decrease in the R-Squared of the model from about 62% to about 32%
reects the fact that the stratication of the sample absorbs a large part of the variation in
the regressors (e.g. educational attainment), which otherwise explain a signicant part of the
variation in wages.
3.2 Wage Decomposition and Firm Wage-Component
Our second approach to identication and estimation is based on quite another idea, which
tries to capitalize on the availability of panel data with respect to the rm.12 Still, we can
use the additional source of variation in wages stemming from the fact that the SWSS has a
longitudinal structure (at least with respect to the rm) such that we can apply simple panel
data methods. To start with, let us assume that the observed natural logarithm of the wage yit
of individual i in a given year t can (conceptually) be decomposed in a linear model as follows:
yijt = t + i +  j + ijt (4)
Abstracting from time xed-eects (t), equation (4) states that individual i's wage is the
sum of an individual wage xed-eect i, a rm wage xed-eect  j, and a remaining random
error component ijt. The critical assumptions in this simple linear xed eects model are
the assumptions about the time invariance of both the individual and the rm xed eect.
However, since we are using panel data spanning only a short time period we believe that
these assumptions are innocuous for our application { nonetheless allowing us to resort to
the power of panel data methods. Importantly, note that the theory of compensating wage
dierentials essentially makes statements about the wage component specic to the employer
(i.e.  j), but not to the individual-specic part nor the random part of the wage. If it is
possible to consistently estimate the wage rm xed eect  j from the available data, we can
12Of course, we could capitalize on repeated individual observations using for example the techniques proposed
by Abowd and Kramarz (1999), but as explained in section 2, we only have temporal information about the
employer but not the individual workers.
10essentially get rid of individual heterogeneity by simply running a hedonic wage regressing
using the estimated wage rm-xed eect ^  j instead of the observed wage yijt on our risk
measure r, although we can not directly control for unobserved individual heterogeneity in
the hedonic wage regression (because, remember, the risk measure is not observed over time
and because there is no person-identier in the SWSS). Thus, in a rst stage, we run a simple
regression model using the three consecutive waves of the SWSS:
yijt =  + x0
it + z0
jt + t +  j + uijt with sij = 4 (5)
Here, as before, x and z are vectors of observed individual and rm characteristics and the
parameter t captures aggregate wage shifts over time. The vector x of observed individual
characteristics is important here because we essentially use x to proxy for otherwise unobserved
individual heterogeneity. Moreover, we run this regression on a subset of individuals working in
jobs with the lowest skill-level only, such that we can further dampen the problem of unobserved
heterogeneity. The regression model given by equation (5) is only of interest here because it
allows us to estimate the rm wage xed eects, represented by the vector  j. Practically,  j
is estimated from the data by including a separate dummy variable for each rm in the sample.
In the second stage, we run a regression very similar to the hedonic model from equation (1):
^  ijk =  + x0
i + z0
j + rk + uijk with sij = 4 (6)
where now the dependent variable is the estimated rm wage xed eect ^  ijk of individual i
working in rm j. Note that the unit of observation is still the individual worker, although the
rm xed eect obviously does not vary between individuals working in the same rm. This
procedure, though, directly applies the right weighting scheme. Again, rk is the non-fatal risk
measure in industryskill-level cell k. Note that we still have to include both vector x and z,
because the estimated wage rm xed eect ^   is not independent of x and z. The main point
is that the estimated wage rm xed eect ^   should have been separated from the unobserved
individual-specic component .
Figure 2 about here
As shown in gure 2, a simple scatterplot of the average rm wage xed-eect (averaged
within industries) versus the number of non-fatal accidents now shows a clear positive relation
between the two variables (as opposed to gure 1, which showed no relation between the two
measures at all).13 A simple regression of the average wage rm xed eect on the number
of non-fatal accidents yields an estimated slope coecient of 0.0034, which marginally reaches
statistical signicance (t-value of about 1.6).
Table 3 about here
13The last column in table A.1 in the chapter appendix shows the estimated rm wage xed-eect by industry
(at the two-digit level, only for the lowest skill-level of jobs).
11Results from hedonic wage regressions using the wage rm xed eect as the dependent
variable are shown in table 3. The left panel of table 3 reproduces, for the purpose of com-
parison, the simple hedonic wage regression using the whole sample and using workers from
the lowest skill-level only. The remaining columns show the corresponding estimates using the
wage rm xed eect as dependent variable instead. It turns out that using the rm xed
eect of the wage instead of the observed wage makes a huge dierence with respect to the
estimated compensation for workplace risk, but only in the subsample of least skilled work-
ers. For example, using the accident risk at the more disaggregated level (i.e. at the level of
industryskill-level of the job), the point estimate of the risk parameter more then doubles
when using ^   instead of y directly as the dependent variable in the regression, yielding a point
estimate of 0.00067 (with a signicant t-value of about 2.4). This result is moreover in line
with the story of workers sorting into jobs based on their (partially) unobserved productivity,
because the main dierence between the left and the right panel of table 3 is that variation
in y reects to a substantial part variation in unobserved productivity, whereas variation in ^  
much less so. In the overall sample, however, using the wage rm xed eect yields almost the
same estimates as when using the observed wage as dependent variable directly.
On the other hand, using risk measures at a less aggregated level has the same eect
throughout of increasing the point estimate of risk compensation. This is true in the overall
sample as well as in the subsample of less skilled workers, and it holds true whether the overall
wage or the wage rm xed eect is used as dependent variable.
3.3 The Value of a Statistical Injury
Given an estimate for the compensation for non-fatal accident risk, we can easily compute
the value of a statistical injury (i.e. non-fatal accident). Because all our estimates of the risk
parameter are based on semi-logarithmic regressions, the estimated risk coecient corresponds
to the relative wage which 1,000 workers are willing to forego in order to prevent one non-fatal
accident (and thus is independent of the time period chosen). Thus, multiplying the estimated
risk parameter by 1,000 yields the estimated relative value of a statistical injury (VSI). Since
our risk measure refers to non-fatal accident per year, we will phrase the VSI in terms of average
annual earnings (that is, we multiply VSI additionally with the average annual earnings in the
corresponding group of workers).
Table 4 about here
Table 4 shows estimates for the value of a statistical injury computed from the dierent
estimation methods discussed above (expressed in terms of the average annual earnings in the
corresponding sample of workers). The main estimates are based on the point estimate of the
risk variable. Lower and upper bounds on the value of a statistical injury are based on the
95% condence interval of each point estimate of the parameter  (based on robust standard
errors). The simple hedonic wage regression based on the pooled sample actually yields a
negative estimate for the value of a statistical injury (per injury per year). Only using the
12upper bound of the condence interval yields the expected positive value (although still a small
one).
Stratication of the sample by the skill-level of the job yields a higher value of a statistical
injury, the narrower the sample. Focusing on workers in the lowest skill-level only gives an
estimate of about 2,600 Swiss francs (accident risk at the level of industry only) and about
13,000 Swiss francs (accident risk at the level of industryskill-level of the job), respectively.
However, note that the estimate based on the lower bound of the condence interval though
still gives a negative estimate in both cases.
Finally, for the subsample of less skilled workers again, using the wage rm xed eect
gives a signicant positive value of a statistical injury (even if we use the lower bound of the
corresponding condence interval). Based on the point estimate, we get an estimated value of
a statistical injury of about 9,900 and about 36,000 Swiss francs per non-fatal accident averted
per year, depending on the risk measure used. This value ts into the range reported by most
other empirical studies (see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, again).
4 Conclusions
We provide empirical estimates of the value of a statistical injury for Switzerland for the
year 2004, using non-fatal accident risk within industryskill-level cells and applying dierent
approaches to identication. Specically, we stratify the sample by the skill level of the job
and we try to statistically isolate the rm-specic wage component, to which the theory of
compensating wage dierentials conceptually applies most directly.
It turns out that both the risk measure and the empirical method actually make a huge dif-
ference with respect to the estimation of risk compensation. Simple hedonic wage regressions
actually yield negative or zero compensation for non-fatal accident risk at the workplace. Mov-
ing on to methods we believe are more reliable (i.e. consistent) pushes the risk compensation
in the \right" direction (i.e. yielding positive compensation for accident risk). Our preferred
estimation method, based on using a restricted sample of workers in jobs of lowest skill-level
only and using the wage rm xed eect instead of the observed wage, gives a substantial
estimate for the value of a statistical injury of about 36,000 Swiss francs, which is within the
range given by both studies from inside and outside the U.S. labor market. Consistent with
existing evidence, individuals' willingness to pay for workplace safety is substantial - reecting
a more general trend in increasing prices in nonmarket goods (Costa and Kahn, 2003).
Our analysis, by comparing the magnitude of risk compensation, also sheds some light on
the problem of endogenous sorting of workers based on their (unobserved) productivity-relevant
characteristics. The more attention we pay to mitigating unobserved productivity dierences
(i.e. by focusing on narrower groups of workers), the larger the estimates for risk compensation
we get. This pattern seems to be consistent with the hypothesis that high-productivity workers
select into lower-risk jobs by accepting lower wages.
13References
Abowd, J. M. and Kramarz, F. (1999). Econometric Analyses of Linked Employer{Employee
Data. Labour Economics, 6(1), 53{74.
Ashenfelter, O. (2006). Measuring the Value of a Statistical Life: Problems and Prospects.
The Economic Journal, 116, C10{C23.
Baranzini, A. and Ferro-Luzzi, G. (2001). The Economic Value of Risks to Life and Health:
Evidence from the Swiss Labour Market. Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 137(2),
149{170.
Black, D. and Kniesner, T. (2003). On the Measurement of Job Risk in Hedonic Wage Models.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 27(3), 205{220.
Costa, D. and Kahn, M. (2003). The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods. American Economic
Review, 93(2), 227{232.
Costa, D. and Kahn, M. (2004). Changes in the Value of Life, 1940{1980. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 29(2), 159{180.
Dale-Olsen, H. (2006). Estimating Workers' Marginal Willingness to Pay for Safety using
Linked Employer-Data. Economica, 73, 99{127.
DeLeire, T. and Levy, H. (2004). Worker Sorting and the Risk of Death on the Job. Journal
of Labor Economics, 22(4), 925{954.
Dreyfus, M. K. and Viscusi, W. K. (1995). Rates of Time Preference and Consumer Valuations
of Automobile Safety and Fuel Eciency. Journal of Law & Economics, 38(1), 79{105.
Feinberg, R. M. (1981). Earnings-Risk as a Compensating Dierential. Southern Economic
Journal, 48(1), 156{163.
Garen, J. (1988). Compensating Wage Dierentials and the Endogeneity of Job Riskiness. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 70(1), 9{16.
Hwang, H.-S., Reed, W. R., and Hubbard, C. (1992). Compensating Wage Dierentials and
Unobserved Productivity. Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), 835{58.
Jenkins, R. R., Owens, N., and Wiggins, L. B. (2001). Valuing Reduced Risks to Children:
The Case of Bicycle Safety Helmets. Contemporary Economic Policy, 19(4), 397{408.
Kostiuk, P. F. (1990). Compensating Dierentials for Shift Work. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 98(5), 1054{75.
Lalive, R. (2003). Did We Overestimate the Value of Health? Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
27(2), 171{193.
Lalive, R., Ruf, O., and Zweim uller, J. (2006). Compensating Wage Dierentials for Employ-
ment Risk: Evidence from Linked Firm-Worker Data. Mimeo, University of Zurich.
Leeth, J. and Ruser, J. (2003). Compensating Wage Dierentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury
Risk by Gender and Race. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 27(3), 257{277.
Mellow, W. and Sider, H. (1983). Accuracy of Response in Labor Market Surveys: Evidence
and Implications. Journal of Labor Economics, 1(4), 331{44.
14Moretti, E. (2000). Do Wages Compensate for Risk of Unemployment? Parametric and Semi-
parametric Evidence from Seasonal Jobs. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 20(1), 45{66.
Moulton, B. (1986). Random Group Eects and the Precision of Regression Estimates. Journal
of Econometrics, 32(3), 385{397.
Murphy, K. and Topel, R. (2006). The Value of Health and Longevity. Journal of Political
Economy, 114(5), 871{904.
Shogren, J. F. and Stamland, T. (2002). Skill and the Value of Life. Journal of Political
Economy, 110(5), 1168{1197.
Stern, S. (2004). Do Scientists Pay to Be Scientists? Management Science, 50(6), 835.
Viscusi, W. K. (1993). The Value of Risks to Life and Health. Journal of Economic Literature,
31(4), 1912{46.
Viscusi, W. K. and Aldy, J. E. (2003). The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of
Market Estimates throughout the World. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 27(1), 5{76.
Viscusi, W. K. and Hersch, J. (2001). Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers. The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 83(2), 269{280.
Viscusi, W. K. and O'Connor, C. J. (1984). Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: Are
Workers Bayesian Decision Makers? American Economic Review, 74(5), 942{56.
Wei, X. (2007). Wage compensation for job-related illness: Evidence from a matched employer
and employee survey in the UK. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 34(1), 85{98.
Woodcock, S. D. (2008). Wage Dierentials in the Presence of Unobserved Worker, Firm, and
Match Heterogeneity. Labour Economics, 15(3), 772{794.
15Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Skill-level 4 Skill-level 1-4
Monthly wage 4;526:625 (1;069:261) 6;371:884 (3;466:716)
ln(monthly wage) 8:392 (0:226) 8:676 (0:381)
non fatal 1000 45:400 (59:129) 93:007 (150:420)
non fatal 1000 wirt abt 103:176 (115:139) 93:110 (111:371)
Age 40:189 (11:661) 40:710 (11:143)
Female: Yes = 1 0:540 (0:498) 0:421 (0:494)
Tenure 7:633 (8:181) 9:058 (9:121)
Size of the rm 2;714:938 (7;820:838) 3;108:008 (7;890:729)
Marital status
Single 0:267 (0:443) 0:317 (0:465)
Married 0:621 (0:485) 0:583 (0:493)
Others 0:112 (0:315) 0:100 (0:301)
Education
University degree 0:003 (0:054) 0:055 (0:228)
College of higher education 0:003 (0:052) 0:048 (0:214)
Higher professional degree 0:006 (0:078) 0:074 (0:261)
Teachers' certicate 0:001 (0:039) 0:005 (0:068)
High School 0:012 (0:108) 0:020 (0:139)
Finished professional education 0:274 (0:446) 0:505 (0:500)
Firm intern professional education 0:138 (0:344) 0:067 (0:251)
Secondary school 0:480 (0:500) 0:176 (0:381)
Other degree 0:083 (0:277) 0:050 (0:219)
Citizenship
Swiss citizenship 0:522 (0:500) 0:680 (0:466)
Short term residence authorization 0:012 (0:110) 0:007 (0:085)
Long term residence authorization 0:083 (0:276) 0:055 (0:227)
Permanent residence permit 0:290 (0:454) 0:167 (0:373)
Cross-border commuter 0:060 (0:238) 0:065 (0:247)
Others 0:033 (0:180) 0:026 (0:159)
Geographical region
VD, VS, GE 0:186 (0:389) 0:163 (0:370)
BE, FR, SO, NE, JU 0:230 (0:421) 0:212 (0:409)
BS, BL, AG 0:123 (0:329) 0:142 (0:349)
ZH 0:236 (0:424) 0:267 (0:443)
GL, SH, AR, AI, SG, GR, TG 0:114 (0:318) 0:113 (0:317)
LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, ZG 0:073 (0:260) 0:070 (0:255)
TI 0:038 (0:192) 0:032 (0:176)
Number of rms 3,533 3,533
Numer of observations 130,976 468,328
Notes: Table entries are sample means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Columns (1) and (2)
refer to the subsample of workers in jobs of lowest skill-level, columns (3) and (4) to the full sample
of workers. Sources: All variables are taken from the SWSS, except the number of non-fatal acci-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = −.0001 ; t−value = −.4
Notes: The y-axis shows the average logarithm of monthly gross earnings and the x-axis
shows the number of non-fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in lowest
job skill-level only. See also table A.1 in the appendix.




























0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Non fatal accidents for 1,000 workers
beta = .0034 ; t−value = 1.6
Notes: The y-axis shows the average of the wage rm xed eect and the x-axis the number
of non-fatal accidents per 1,000 workers per year. Workers in lowest job skill-level only.
See also table A.1 in the appendix.
21A Appendix
Table A.1: Main variables, by industry (lowest skill-level only)
Industry Workers Wage Accidents FFE
Petroleum rening and processing 4692 5,560.13 0.14 0.78
Oce material production, data processing 4288 4,302.83 0.59 -0.62
Information technology services 6237 3,933.30 2.39 -0.76
Shipping 55 5,467.47 3.57 0.96
Metal production and processing 7201 4,781.81 5.46 -0.53
Aviation 12 5,496.25 6.22 -0.44
Production of leather goods and shoes 229 3,628.01 8.94 -1.57
Production of clothes and fur goods 270 3,741.27 9.89 -1.87
Insurance industry 2086 5,300.57 10.53 1.38
Production of medical technology 7421 4,523.07 11.55 -0.26
Retail business 19118 4,090.10 12.26 -0.22
Tobacco processing 636 5,977.87 12.70 3.61
Production of furniture, jewellery, musical intruments 1743 4,329.91 14.86 -0.27
Machinery, mechanical engineering 5441 4,851.64 20.24 -0.07
Textiles 1350 4,436.00 20.83 -0.73
Automobile industry 1075 4,508.15 22.73 -0.39
Energy- and watersupply 496 5,504.46 25.59 1.79
Trac support 1502 4,360.78 26.35 -0.53
Credit business 3059 5,833.48 28.60 0.91
Paper and carton production 2153 4,917.06 29.64 -0.22
Credit business and insurance industry 70 5,373.94 29.76 0.86
Printing, publishing and distribution industries 3013 4,833.14 36.99 -0.21
Research and development 202 5,478.94 39.78 1.34
Whole sale 7621 4,683.02 41.36 -0.34
Wood processing 810 4,950.09 43.53 0.11
Transportation 2236 4,724.08 46.89 -0.29
Rubber and plastic production 2657 4,511.65 48.12 -0.60
Mining 80 5,277.08 50.33 2.03
Agriculture 6756 4,310.73 57.05 -0.96
Mining 1217 4,821.76 59.91 -0.26
Health and welfare system 19642 4,582.02 65.31 0.92
Hotel and restaurant industry 9676 3,743.90 76.98 -0.01
Real estate 581 4,784.07 95.10 0.69
Information transmission 55 4,707.71 111.04 0.05
Entertainment 814 4,208.07 113.46 -0.44
Education 744 4,394.47 221.19 0.64
Personal services 238 4,318.43 233.62 2.31
Waste management 95 4,953.19 242.00 0.37
Lobby, associations, organizations 512 5,067.35 264.88 1.22
Construction 4893 4,965.64 289.03 0.25
Notes: Table entries show sample averages within industries, sorted by accident risk. \Workers" shows the
absolute number of observations. \Accidents" shows the number of non-fatal accidents per 1,000 workers.
\Wage" is the average logarithm of gross monthly earnings. \FFE" denotes the average rm xed eect, as
given by equation (5), and is (in the table) standardized to mean 0 and variance 1.
22